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Abstract. The resource-constrained nature of the Internet of Things
(IoT) devices, poses a challenge in designing a secure, reliable, and par-
ticularly high-performance communication for this family of devices. Al-
though side-channel resistant ciphers (either block cipher or stream ci-
pher) are the well-suited solution to establish a guaranteed secure com-
munication, the energy-intensive nature of these ciphers makes them
undesirable for particularly lightweight IoT solutions. In this paper, we
introduce ExTru, a novel encrypted communication protocol based on
stream ciphers that adds a configurable switching & toggling network
(CSTN ) to not only boost the performance of the communication in
lightweight IoT devices, it also consumes far less energy compared with
the conventional side-channel resistant ciphers. Although the overall struc-
ture of the proposed scheme is leaky against physical attacks, such as
side-channel or new scan-based Boolean satisfiability (SAT ) attack or
algebraic attack, we introduce a dynamic encryption mechanism that re-
moves this vulnerability. We demonstrate how each communicated mes-
sage in the proposed scheme reduces the level of trust. Accordingly, since
a specific number of messages, N , could break the communication and
extract the key, by using the dynamic encryption mechanism, ExTru can
re-initiate the level of trust periodically after T messages where T < N ,
to protect the communication against side-channel and scan-based at-
tacks (e.g. SAT attack). Furthermore, we demonstrate that by properly
configuring the value of T , ExTru not only increases the strength of se-
curity from per “device” to per “message”, it also significantly improves
energy consumption as well as throughput in comparison with an archi-
tecture that only uses a conventional side-channel resistant block/stream
cipher.
Keywords: Internet-of-Thing, Secure Communication, Lightweight Cryptogra-
phy, Block Cipher, Stream Cipher, Physical Attack
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT), which has been foreseen to become the most
successful business for the next decade by International Technology Roadmap
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for Semiconductors (ITRS), is an inevitable landmark of smart life providing
novel applications and services, ranging from business automation to personal
day-to-day life [23,1,44]. The IoT infrastructure is the seamless connection of
billions of heterogeneous devices (”things”) within a large integrated network
(the ”Internet”). The heterogeneity of IoT constitutes from a wide variety of
devices, such as smartwatches, mobile phones, etc, which results in a drastic
increase in the number of IoT devices, estimated to be 26 billion connected IoT
devices by the end of 2020 [22].
Although IoT devices provide a more efficient, automated, and smart life,
from security/privacy perspective, many threats and vulnerabilities have been
raised in IoT devices. Many investigations on cyber-based threats demonstrate
that there are 176 new cyber-threats every minute, and over 2.5 million within
only four months [33]. Several incidents have highlighted the massive influence
of counterfeit/cloned/tampered devices into the supply chain [52,36]. As an in-
stance, influencing and controlling every connected device within a ZigBee net-
work, which is one of the most prevalent wireless communications in IoT, has
been illustrated in [49,15]. Another recent evaluation by HP demonstrates that
70% of the devices in IoT are vulnerable to different types of threats, including
physical attacks [42].
In current IoT applications, almost all proposed IoT devices are working
(and communicating) based on a very well known 3-layer hierarchical architec-
ture that is illustrated in Fig. 1. These three layers, i.e. ”devices”, ”gateways”
and ”servers” are the main layers in IoT architecture [29,30]. The devices that
are responsible for interacting between the physical environment and computer-
based systems, called edge, can connect with servers through gateways. Accord-
ingly, equipping edge devices with some fundamental components, including sen-
sors, analog to digital (A/D) converters, inter-communication frameworks, mem-
ories, and embedded micro-controllers, is required, to provide the capability of
collecting, processing, and relaying data in a heterogeneous network.
Although several IoT security challenges should be considered meticulously,
combating hardware threats that are generally initiated at edge (devices layer),
requires more attention [33]. Numerous solutions, including communication stan-
dards optimization, more secure configuration, etc, have been introduced to pro-
tect IoT devices and their communications against physical threats, which help to
prevent the wide variety of conventional attacks [46,25]. For instance, the utiliza-
tion of symmetric-based secret-key ciphers or keyed hash-based authentication
code (HMAC) is prevalent in IoT devices to provide integrity and authentication
while securely protect the inter-communication of IoT edge devices [43,53,18].
Considering that the power consumption (particularly energy consumption)
constraints in resource-constrained edge devices are very strict, the energy over-
head of security solutions against hardware threats must be minimized. For in-
stance, tight restrictions in edge devices enforce the designer to employ lightweight
ciphers, such as stream ciphers or lightweight block ciphers [11,41]. However, the
energy consumption of this breed of encryption architectures is still high for a
high portion of IoT edge devices. Also, the performance of these ciphers consid-
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Fig. 1: A Standard IoT Model with Hardware Vulnerabilities.
erably lower than regular block ciphers. This creates an inevitable security/cost
trade-off in lightweight IoT devices, which results in sacrificing one of them,
i.e. the security or the cost, which motivates the research community to carry
on working/investigating on a low-energy and security-enhanced communication
scheme in IoT while the performance is not degraded.
In this paper, we introduce a new lightweight, fast, and provably secure
Expirable Trust (ExTru) mechanism relied on a configurable switching and tog-
gling network (CSTN) as well as the winner of the Competition for Authen-
ticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) [10],
called ACORN [58]. ExTru provably protects the inter-communication of IoT
edge devices while it even obtains higher performance and mitigates the energy
consumption compared to the case in which the regular block/stream ciphers
have been used. Moreover, we show how ExTru engages dynamicity in the cir-
cuit to provide guaranteed protection against different types of physical and
scan-based attacks, such as side-channel, Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attack,
and algebraic attack. We demonstrate that by using this dynamic encryption
scheme, the strength of security could be elevated from per device to per mes-
sage. The contributions of our paper are as follows:
1. By introducing a near non-blocking configurable switching and toggling net-
work (CSTN), we show how we add dynamicity to the IoT devices intercom-
munication.
2. We show that this dynamicity along with the fast and efficient ACORN
invalidates the possibility of the leakage of each message, which helps to
show that this approach is provably resilient against physical attacks such
as side-channel, scan-based SAT attack, and algebraic attack.
3. The dynamicity of ExTru allows us to relax the responsibility of ACORN,
which helps to considerably boost the performance of the communication
channel between IoT devices while the possibility of leakage is almost ZERO.
Also by conveying part of the responsibility to the near non-blocking CSTN,
we show that the energy consumption would be mitigated considerably.
3
4. To depict the efficiency of ExTru in terms of security, energy, and perfor-
mance, we provide a full-detailed post-route evaluation on the proposed
scheme compared to conventional IoT inter-communication mechanisms that
almost use a conventional side-channel resistant block/stream.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the previ-
ous work. Section 3 elaborates the overall structure of the proposed dynamically
encrypted scheme and how it is able to guarantee the security of IoT commu-
nication with significant energy mitigation as well as throughput improvement
compared to conventional cipher-based communication schemes. In section 4,
we evaluate the security of ExTru against physical attacks such as side-channel,
scan-based SAT, and algebraic attack. In 5, the experimental results have been
provided and discussed. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Due to the resource-constrained nature of IoT devices, a big challenge in guar-
anteeing the security of this group of devices is that the implementation of the
security measures must be sufficiently lightweight, which prevents the designers
to directly use conventional block ciphers, such as AES-GCM [34]. Many studies
have been taken by the research community to not only address security issues
in IoT networks but also to increase the efficiency by lowering the power (par-
ticularly energy) consumption and increasing the throughput. For instance, the
fact that the elliptic curves cryptography (ECC) achieves guaranteed security
with reduced resource requirements has attracted the research community [2,24].
The work in [31] has constructed an optimized ECC for secure communication
in heterogeneous IoT devices based on Schnorr signature. Also, a simple key ne-
gotiation protocol has been introduced in this work that is based on the Schnorr
scheme to demonstrate the usability of the presented ECC optimizations.
Based on the desirable features of a physically unclonable function (PUF),
such as lightweightedness, unpredictability, unclonability, and uniqueness, many
researchers have been motivated to concentrate on the usage of this module to
build a secure communication for IoT devices. Among several studies on PUF-
based secure communication for IoT devices [4,50,51,56], the work in [50] has
introduced an authentication, key sharing, and secure communication architec-
ture, in which each IoT device has an integrated PUF. In this work, the identity
of each device is created by the challenge-response pair signature of its PUF
instance, and by engaging the identity-based encryption scheme proposed in
Boneh and Franklin, the security of this approach is proven against attacks like
chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attack.
Numerous software/hardware implementation of lightweight ciphers suited
for IoT devices have been proposed in recent few years, including RECTANGLE
[57], PICO [16], Extended-LILIPUT [35], SIT [37], SKINNY [7], MANTIS [7],
to name but a few. Some of these ciphers could provide the best performance on
software implementation, however, a portion of them have better performance in
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hardware implementation. For instance, the work in [37] introduces a lightweight
64-bit symmetric block cipher, called SIT, whose implementation is a mixture of
Feistel and a uniform substitution-permutation network. The proposed approach
uses some logical operations along with some swapping and substitution. Most
of the encryption algorithms designed for IoT reduced the number of rounds to
make a cost-security trade-off. For instance, SIT uses five rounds of encryption
with 5 different keys to improve energy efficiency.
The lightweightedness of the stream ciphers, on the other hand, has re-
ceived fascinated attention from many researchers’ in recent years [6,48,3,9].
Since IoT being an emerging field requires lightweight cipher designs with ro-
bustness, less complexity, and lower energy consumption, stream ciphers are very
suited for particularly edge devices. Many studies evaluate the possibility of en-
gaging stream ciphers in IoT devices, such as WG-8 [59], Trivium [8], Quavium
[60], and ACORN [58].
3 ExTru Infrastructure
ExTru consists of four main sub-modules: (1) ACORN as a stream cipher that
would be used periodically (The frequency will be discussed further), (2) a config-
urable switching and toggling network (CSTN) that dynamically permutes/toggles
the data based on the configuration generated by TRNG, (3) a random number
generator (RNG) that is responsible for generating random data for Thresh-
old Implementation of ACORN as well as for generating the CSTN configu-
ration, and (4) a substitution box placed after CSTN to eliminate the linear-
ity/predictability of the ciphertext. The overall architecture of ExTru has been
demonstrated in Fig. 2 for both transmitter side and receiver side.
On the transmitter side, the CSTN is used to permute/toggle the plain-
text using the configuration (TRN) generated by the random number gener-
ator (RNG). The RNG will periodically change the configuration (TRN) to
add dynamicity into the permutation/toggle network (CSTN). Parts of the con-
figuration is fed by the permuted/toggled data (the output of the CSTN) to
make the operation stateful (data-dependent). The CSTN is followed only by
a substitution-box to eliminate the linearity/predictability of the output. The
TRN that is used to configure the CSTN has been also encrypted using the
authenticated cipher to be transmitted to the receiver. The key used for authen-
ticated cipher could be pre-stored in the secure memory or produced by a PUF.
The output of the transmitter (ciphertext) would be selected from the output of
the s-box (permuted/toggled + substituted plaintext) or authenticated cipher
output (encrypted TRN).
On the receiver side, on the other hand, the reverse CSTN (RCSTN) must
be used to recover the permuted/toggled + substituted plaintext. We will show
that similar to ACORN that engages only one hardware module for both en-
cryption/decryption, the CSTN hardware is the same for both receiving/sending
operations (same hardware for both CSTN and RCSTN). Hence, no duplicated
hardware (one for CSTN and one for RCSTN) is required to be added on each
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Fig. 2: ExTru Overall Infrastructure (a) Transmitter, (b) Receiver
side. When TRN is received from the transmitter it must be decrypted using the
authenticated cipher to be used as the configuration of the RCSTN. If the re-
ceived data is not TRN, it first must pass the s-box to accomplish re-substitution,
then it must pass the RCSTN to recover the plaintext.
Fig. 3 depicts the overall structure of dynamic encryption provided by ExTru,
which has no sign of leaky communication. As shown in Fig. 3(b), for each
specific number of transmission (T ), which must be less than N , a new CSTN
configuration will be sent via side-channel resistant cipher. As it is shown, a
secure message (S), which contains TRN, will be sent periodically after every T
messages (I) that are handled by CSTN/RCSTN. Based on different forms of
attacks, such as side-channel, scan-based SAT, and algebraic attack, messages (I)
are leaky. So, periodically changing TRN (S) and sending through side-channel
resistant ciphers re-intensify the security of the communication.
Based on the size of the CSTN/RCSTN (number of I/O), we will show that
the maximum feasible update frequency (N) would be changed. Consequently,
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Fig. 3: (a) The overall structure of using Dynamically Encrypted communication (b)
Re-intensifying the Security Strength by Dynamically Encrypted communication
the CSTN configuration (TRN), which is fed by RNG, must be changed dynam-
ically after every T iterations, where T < N . Also, the size of CSTN/RCSTN
determines the number of configuration bits (size of each S) must be gener-
ated by the RNG. In the following sub-sections we discuss the details of ExTru
implementation.
3.1 Configurable Switching & Toggling Network (CSTN)
The CSTN is a logarithmic routing (permutation) network that could permute
the order of the signals at its input pins to its output pins while possibly toggling
their logic levels based on its configuration (TRN). Fig. 4(a) captures a simple
implementation of an 8×8 CSTN based on OMEGA network [17]. The network is
constructed using permutation elements, denoted as Re-Routing Blocks (RRB).
Each RRB is able to possibly toggle and permute each of the input signals to
each of its outputs. The number of RRBs needed to implement this simple CSTN
for N inputs (N is a power of 2) is simply N/2× logN .
Each CSTN should be paired with an RCSTN. RCSTN must be able to re-
verse all operations accomplished by CSTN to re-generate the plaintext. Due to
the structure of CSTN, RCSTN can be implemented by vertically flipping the
CSTN without any change in configuration [32]. In fact, by vertically flipping
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Fig. 4: Logarithmic Network (a) Blocking, (b) Near Non-blocking.
the CSTN, and then applying the same configuration, we re-generate plaintext.
So, implementing RCSTN by vertically flipping the CSTN allows us to use the
same configuration for both CSTN and RCSTN. However, to avoid duplicat-
ing the hardware (to put one dedicated hardware for CSTN and one dedicated
hardware for RCSTN), by flipping the configuration bits (row-pivot reversed
TRN), the CSTN would operate as its corresponded reverse CSTN. Hence, only
one hardware is enough to operate as both CSTN and RCSTN (using TRN or
row-pivot reversed TRN).
The OMEGA network along with many other networks of such nature (BUT-
TERFLY, etc.) are blocking networks [17], in which we cannot produce all per-
mutations of input at the network’s output pins. This limitation significantly
reduces the ability of a CSTN to randomize its input. Also, Evaluation of this
permutation networks as a means of obfuscation to defend supply chain shows
that the blocking version of this breed of networks could be easily broken by a
SAT attack within few iterations [19,26].
Being a blocking or a non-blocking CSTN depends on the number of stages
in CSTN. Since no two paths in an RRB are allowed to use the same link to form
a connection, for a specific number of RRB columns, only a limited number of
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permutations is feasible. However, adding extra stages could transform a blocking
CSTN into a strictly non-blocking CSTN. Using a strictly non-blocking CSTN
not only improves the randomization of propagated messages through the CSTN,
but also improves the resiliency of these networks against possible SAT attacks
for extraction of a TRN used as the key for a CSTN-RCSTN cipher. A non-
blocking logarithmic network could be represented using LOGn,m,p, where n is
the number of inlets/outlets, m is the number of extra stages, and p indicates
the number of copies vertically cascaded [12].
According to [12], to have a strictly non-blocking CSTN for an arbitrary n,
the smallest feasible values of p and m impose very large area/power overhead.
For instance, for n = 64, the smallest feasible values, which make it strictly non-
blocking, are m = 3 and p = 6, which means there exists more than 5× as much
overhead compared to a blocking CSTN with the same n, resulting in a significant
increase in the area and delay overhead. To avoid such large overhead, we employ
a close to non-blocking CSTN described in [12] to implement the CSTN-RCSTN
pair. This network is able to generate not all, but almost all permutations,
while it could be implemented using a LOGn,log2(n)−2,1 configuration, meaning
it needs log2(n)−2 extra stages and no additional copy. Fig. 4(b), demonstrates
an example of such a near non-blocking CSTN with n = 8.
Based on the structure of CSTN/RCSTN, and the size used for implementa-
tion, the size of configuration bits (S) would be changed. For instance, for a near
non-blocking LOG64,4,1, the number of selectors is 960 (2log2(64)− 2)(32)(3) (3
selectors in each 2× 2 switches (Fig. 4)). Based on the size of configuration, and
the number of messages that could be sent in each interval (T ), the overhead
(time/energy) would be changed in ExTru. However, we show that since (T ) is
large enough, the performance boost, as well as the mitigating of the energy
consumption, would be considerably high.
3.2 Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
The Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) is used in ExTru
for the transmission of the CSTN-RCSTN configuration (TRN). Authenticated
ciphers incorporate the functionality of confidentiality, integrity, and authenti-
cation. The input of an authenticated cipher includes plaintext (message), as-
sociated data (AD), public message number (NPUB), and secret key. Then, the
ciphertext is generated as a function of these inputs. A tag, which depends on
all inputs, is generated after message encryption to assure the integrity and
authenticity of the transaction. This tag is then verified after the decryption
process. The choice of AEAD could significantly affect the area overhead of the
solution, the speed of encrypted communication, and the extra energy/power
consumption. To show the performance, power/energy, and area trade-offs, we
employ two AEAD solutions: a NIST compliant solution (AES-GCM) [34], and
a promising lightweight solution (ACORN) [58].
AES-GCM is the current National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) standard for authenticated encryption and decryption as defined in
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[34]. ACORN is one of two finalists of the Competition for Authenticated En-
cryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR), in the category
of lightweight authenticated ciphers, as defined in [58]. An 8-bit side-channel
protected version of AES-GCM and a 1-bit side-channel protected version of
ACORN are implemented as described in [55]. Both implementations comply
with lightweight version of the CAESAR HW API [14].
Our methodology for side-channel resistant is threshold implementation (TI),
which has wide acceptance as a provably secure Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) countermeasure [45]. In TI, sensitive data is separated into shares and
the computations are performed on these shares independently. TI must satisfy
three properties: (1) Non-completeness: Each share must lack at least one piece
of sensitive data, (2) Correctness: The final recombination of the result must
be correct, and (3) Uniformity: An output distribution should match the input
distribution. To ensure uniformity, we refresh TI shares after non-linear trans-
formations using randomness. We use a hybrid 2-share/3-share approach, where
all linear transformations in each cipher are protected using two shares, which
are expanded to three shares only for non-linear transformations.
To verify the resistance against DPA, we employ the Test Vector Leakage As-
sessment methodology in [5]. We leverage a ”fixed versus random” non-specific
t-test, in which we randomly interleave first fixed test vectors and then randomly-
generated test vectors, leading to two sequences with the same length but differ-
ent values. Using means and variances of power consumption for our fixed and
random sequences, we compute a figure of merit t. If |t| > 4.5, we reason that we
can distinguish between the two populations and that our design is leaking in-
formation. The protected AES-GCM design has a 5-stage pipeline and encrypts
one 128-bit input block in 205 cycles. This requires 40 bits of randomness per
cycle. In ACORN-1, there are ten 1-bit TI-protected AND-gate modules, which
consume a total of 20 random re-share, and 10 random refresh bits per state
update. In a two-cycle architecture, 15 random bits are required per clock cycle.
3.3 Random Number Generator (RNG)
A RNG unit is required on both sides to generate random bits for side-channel
protection of AEAD units, a random public message number (NPUB) for AEAD,
and TRNs for CSTN-RCSTN. We adopted the ERO TRNG core described in
[38], which is capable of generating only 1-bit of random data per over 20,000
clock cycles. In our TI implementations, AES-GCM needs 40 and ACORN 15
bits of random data per cycle. So, we employed a hybrid RNG unit combining the
ERO TRNG with a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). TRNG output
is used as a 128-bit seed to PRNG. The PRNG generates random numbers needed
by other components. The reseeding is performed only once per activation.
We adopted two different implementations of PRNG: (1) AES-CTR PRNG,
which is based on AES, is compliant with the NIST standard SP 800-90A, and
generates 12.8 bits per cycle. (2) Trivium based PRNG, which is based on the
Trivium stream cipher described in [8]. The Trivium-based PRNG is significantly
smaller in terms of area and much faster than AES-CTR PRNG. It can generate
10
64 bits of random data per cycle, however, it is not compliant with the NIST
standard.
Also, the ERO TRNG is equipped with standard-statistical-tests applied
post-fabrication, such as Repetition-Count test and the Adaptive-Proportion
test, as described in NIST SP 800-90B [13], any attempt at weakening the
TRNG during regular operation (i.e. fault attack) can be detected by contin-
uously checking the output of a source of entropy for any signs of a significant
decrease in entropy, noise source failure, and hardware failure.
3.4 Substitution Box (S-Box)
To eliminate the linearity/predictability in ExTru, a non-feistel trial strategy
has been used that is based on Khazad block cipher [39]. The wide trial strategy
is composed of several linear and non-linear transformations that ensures the
dependency of output bits on input bits in a complex manner [21]. The input
and output correlation of this strategy is very large if the linear approximation
is done for even one round. Also the transformation is kept uniform which treats
every bit in a similar manner and provides opposition to differential attacks.
4 Security Analysis of ExTru
Assuming that the attacker can monitor the side-channel information of the chips
during normal operations (based on power/current traces), and the possibility
of having access to the scan chain to apply any form of scan-based attack, in
this section we evaluate the resiliency of ExTru against different physical attacks,
such as side-channel, the scan-based SAT, and algebraic attack. An Attack objec-
tive may be (1) extracting the secret key, or (2) extracting CSTN configuration
(TRNs), or (3) eavesdropping on messages exchanged between the devices.
4.1 Side-Channel Attack (SCA)
The objective of SCA on ExTru is to extract either the secret key used by AEAD
(ACORN) or the TRN used by CSTN. Extracting a secret key is sufficient to
break the communication. By extracting the secret key, the attacker can decrypt
the TRN transmitted between transmitter/receiver, and by knowing the TRN,
the plaintext could be recovered. Similarly, extracting the TRN reveals the com-
municated messages, however, since the TRN would be updated dynamically,
extracting the TRN would reveal only part of the messages. It is worth mention-
ing that assuming that the secret key or TRN is extracted, the functionality of
the s-box would be revealed using specific messages.
Fig. 5 captures our assessment of the side-channel resistance of AEAD us-
ing a t-test for unprotected and protected implementations of AES-GCM and
ACORN [54]. As illustrated, both implementations pass the t-test, indicating the
guaranteed resistance against SCA. Note that this guaranteed resistance against
SCA shows the robustness of communication channel during TRN transmission.
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Fig. 5: The t-test results for unprotected and protected implementations of AES-GCM
and ACORN.
In addition, by adding the dynamicity in ExTru, any form of attacks, includ-
ing SCA, the SAT, and algebraic, must be carried out in a limited time while
the TRN of the CSTN/RCSTN is unchanged. As soon as the TRN is renewed,
the previous side-channel traces or SAT iterations or algebraic calculations are
useless. The period of TRN updates introduces a trade-off between energy and
security and can be pushed to maximum security by changing the TRN for every
new input.
4.2 TRN Extraction using the SAT attack
Since the attacker might have access to the scan chain to apply any form of scan-
based attack, it might be possible to recover and extract the TRN by applying
specific inputs to the CSTN and observing the output. This could be done by
using the SAT attack that is a very applicable and known attack on logic locking
schemes [28]. In this scheme, assuming that the TRN is the unknown parameters
(such as key in logic locking), based on Table 1, it is evident that using blocking
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Table 1: SAT Execution Time on OMEGA-based Blocking CSTN for Different Sizes.
CSTN Size (n) 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512
SAT Iterations 6 7 8 12 14 24 25 TO
SAT Execution Time (Seconds) 0.01 0.03 0.2 0.8 5.9 130.5 1136.2 TO
TO: Timeout = 2× 106 seconds
Table 2: SAT Execution Time on a Close to Non-blocking CSTN, LOGn,log2(n)−2,1, for
Different Sizes.
CSTN Size (n) 4 8 16 32 64
SAT Iterations 14 18 25 32 TO
SAT Execution Time (Seconds) 0.01 0.015 2.35 79.18 TO
TO: Timeout = 2× 106 seconds
CSTN, particularly small size CSTN, does not make the design resilient against
the SAT attacks. The number of iterations in Table 1 shows the number (N)
of specific inputs identified by SAT solver, called Discriminating Inputs (DIPs)
[40]. Finding N DIPs by SAT solver allows the attacker to find CSTN/RCSTN
configuration (TRN), and consequently breaks the scheme. It is evident that
increasing the size of CSTN will increase N (e.g. from N = 6 in size 4 to N = 25
in size 256). For an OMEGA-based CSTN with size 512, SAT is not able to find
the TRN after 2× 106 seconds. Even after 2× 106 seconds execution of SAT, it
could find only 7 DIPs. However, we expect that for an OMEGA-based CSTN
with size 512, SAT needs more than 25 DIPs to find TRN.
Table 2 illustrates that using near non-blocking CSTN considerably enhances
the resiliency of this approach against the SAT attack. As shown in Table 2, for
a near non-blocking CSTN with a size of 64 (LOG64,4,1), the SAT is not able
to find the TRN after 2× 106 seconds. Even after 2× 106 seconds execution of
SAT, it cannot find more than 5 DIPs. However, based on the SAT iterations for
LOG32,3,1, we expect that for a close to non-blocking CSTN with size 64, more
than 32 DIPs are required to extract CSTN configuration.
4.3 Algebraic Attacks
Algebraic attacks involve (a) expressing the cipher operations as a system of
equations, (b) substituting in known data for some variables, and (c) solving for
the key. ACORN has been demonstrated to be resistant against all known types
of algebraic attacks, including linear cryptanalysis. Therefore, in the absence
of any new attacks, the TRN transmission mode is resistant against algebraic
attacks. Using CSTN and RCSTN by itself is new and requires more analysis.
CSTN can be expressed as an affine function of the data input x, of the form
y = A·x+b, where A is an n×n matrix and b is an n×1 vector, with all elements
dependent on the input TRN. Although recovering A and b is not equivalent to
finding the TRN, it may enable the successful decryption of all blocks encrypted
using a given TRN. We protect against this threat in numerous ways: (1) The
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Table 3: Main features of the two ExTru Modes.
Feature Block Stream
AEAD AES-GCM ACORN
PRNG AES-CTR Trivium
BUS Width 8 8
Pins used for Communication 8 8
CSTN-RCSTN Size 64 64
Trusted Memory 4 Kbits 4 Kbits
Cfix: initialization overhead (cycles) 10,492 20,452
Cbyte: cycles needed for encrypting each byte 72 17
PRNGperf : Throughput of generating TRN 128bit/10cycles 64bit/cycle
number of blocks encrypted using a given TRN is set to the value smaller than
n, which prevents generating and solving a system of linear equations with A
and b treated as unknowns, (2) a part of the configuration is data-dependent
and is fed from the output of the CSTN (stateful), so the values of A and b are
not the same in any two encryptions, without the need of feeding CSTN with
two completely different TRN values, (3) the substitution box added after the
CSTN will eliminate all linearity/predictability of the CSTN using the algebraic
attack.
5 Experimental Setup and Analysis
For evaluation, all designs have been implemented using Verilog HDL, and have
been synthesized for both FPGA and ASIC targets. For ASIC verification, we
used Synopsys generic 32nm process. For FPGA verification, we targeted a small
FPGA board, Digilent Nexys-4 DDR with Xilinx Artix 7 (XC7A100T-1CSG324).
In addition, for SAT evaluation, we employed the Lingling-based SAT attack [40]
on a Dell PowerEdge R620 equipped with Intel Xeon E5-2670 2.6 GHz and 64GB
of RAM. Also, as noted, a run-time limit of 2× 106 seconds was set for the SAT
solver. For ciphers, we used two side-channel resistant ciphers (AES-GCM128
as a block authenticated cipher, and ACORN as a lightweight stream cipher).
We have two modes in ExTru: (1) ExTru with AES-GCM, compared with its
corresponding cipher (AES-GCM), (2) ExTru with ACORN, compared with its
corresponding cipher (ACORN). All configurations are listed in Table 3.
Table 4 demonstrates the resource utilization of LOG64,4,1 compared to both
ciphers using Synopsys generic 32nm library, after post-layout (route) verifica-
tion (PLS). As it can be seen, PLS reports show that the power consumption
of LOG64,4,1 is higher than ACORN. However, based on the area utilization,
LOG64,4,1 is considerably smaller than ACORN and AES-GCM. The main rea-
son is that the switching activity of CSTN is high due to numerous permuta-
tion/toggling + substitution which leads to have higher power consumption than
ACORN. Additionally, the delay of critical paths in both ciphers is higher than
that of CSTN. Based on Fig. 2, it is obvious that critical path in ExTru is same
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Table 4: Power, Area, and Delay of LOG64,4,1 compared to protected AES-GCM and
ACORN [55]
Design Power (uW ) Area (nm2) Delay (ns)
LOG64,4,1 1625.5 9965.9 1.74
AES-GCM 3587.1 102487.5 2.48
ACORN 880.9 21843.4 2.3
Table 5: SAT Execution Time on Close to Non-blocking CSTN, LOGn,log2(n)−2,1, for
Different Sizes.
CSTN Area (nm2) Power (uW ) Delay (ns) SAT-Resilient
omega32 1013.1 44.8 1.12 7
log(32, 3, 1) 3067.5 213.5 1.33 7
omega64 2285.5 107.1 1.22 7
log(64, 4, 1) 7438.8 845.1 1.73 X
omega128 5081.5 250.3 1.25 7
omega256 11364.9 579.1 1.35 7
omega512 25458.3 2308 1.42 X
as that of its corresponding cipher. Consequently, we expect that the delay of
critical path in ExTru is approximately equal with that of ciphers.
Also, Table 5 depicts area, power, and the delay of CSTNs in both blocking
and near non-blocking mode with different sizes in the Synopsys generic 32nm
process. As shown, it is evident that using a close to non-blocking CSTN with
size 64, LOG64,4,1, provides the most efficient CSTN structure, which is resilient
against SAT attack. It should be noted that due to having extra stages in close
to non-blocking CSTNs, the delay of these networks is slightly higher than the
blocking CSTNs with the same n, which is negligible.
Table 6 depicts resource utilization of ExTru in each mode of using AES-
GCM or ACORN. As we expected, the critical paths of ExTru in each mode is
same as that of corresponding cipher. In addition, since ExTru consists of both
CSTN and cipher, it is evident that area and power of ExTru in each mode is
approximately equal to summation of total area and total power of both sub-
modules, i.e. CSTN and corresponding cipher. The active power of each design
for different message sizes has been gathered using Synopsys PrimeTime PX.
Fig. 6 demonstrates the power breakdown in each design for a 1KB message. As
it is shown, the leakage powers are roughly the same. The internal power and
switching power of ExTru is almost 23% worse. The main reason for increasing
switching activity is the structure of CSTN for bit-wise permutation/toggling.
Also, internal power has been increased due to merging both CSTN and cipher
into one design.
5.1 Energy/Performance Improvement in ExTru
Although combining CSTN and cipher into ExTru imposes area and power over-
head by almost 24.5% compared to the corresponding cipher, CSTN can generate
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Table 6: ExTru Resource Utilization with Different Ciphers [54]
Design Power (uW ) Area (nm2) Delay (ns)
ExTru with AES-GCM 4448.9 122457.4 2.48
ExTru with ACORN 1694.6 33344.7 2.3
switching internal leakage
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Fig. 6: Power Consumption of ExTru in Comparison with Ciphers.
{permuted/toggled + substituted} data in only one cycle which provides signifi-
cant speed-up compared to especially side-channel resistant ciphers that require
randomness or complex initialization. Fig. 7 demonstrates the time of preparing
data (encryption or permutation/toggling + substitution) for different message
sizes. Increasing the size of the message, which increases the proportion of I to
S, significantly (superlinearly) increases the gap between the execution time of
ExTru compared to its corresponding cipher. As shown, since CSTN prepares
each I in one cycle, increasing the size of the message imposes no degradation on
ExTru performance. The main part of the execution time of ExTru is dedicated
to encrypting and sending S. On the other hand, all data must be encrypted
before sending it while only a cipher is used. So, it increases the execution time
of ciphers linearly due to encryption time. Note that based on our SAT-based
evaluation, the guaranteed number of I messages is 32 (Table 2). Since we use
LOG64,4,1, each I is 64 bits, so 256KB (64 × 32 = 2Kb = 256KB) is the safe
size of sending data through CSTN. The guaranteed speed-up is 3.4× and 1.3×
compared to AES-GCM and ACORN, respectively.
It is evident that for small messages, ExTru works slower than ciphers due
to time overhead of sending encrypted TRN. However, ExTru can accelerate the
execution time up to 25× while the message size is even 2KB. The speed-up
gained by ExTru depends on the structure of the cipher. For instance, the AES-
GCM needs around 300 cycles per each plain data to be first-order side-channel
resistant. However, ACORN as a stream cipher needs fewer cycles per data. So,
ExTru provides better speed-up while the cipher is not streamed/pipelined.
Table 7 depicts energy consumption for different designs, with different mes-
sage sizes. Since energy is a function of time and power, it is obvious that the
energy consumption in ExTru is higher for small message sizes due to the time
overhead of sending encrypted TRN. However, increasing the size of the net-
16
0.5x105
1x105
1.5x105
2x105
2.5x105
3x105
0
Message Size
32 B 64 B 128 B 256 B 512 B 768 B 1024 B 2048 B
Provably Secure against 
Physical Attacks
still Secure against 
Physical Attacks
Guaranteed Speed-Up
(  3.4x improvement)
AES-GCM
ExTru with AES-GCM
(a)
0.5x104
1x104
1.5x104
2x104
2.5x104
0
Message Size
32 B 64 B 128 B 256 B 512 B 768 B 1024 B 2048 B
Provably Secure against 
Physical Attacks
Still Secure against 
Physical Attacks
Guaranteed Speed-Up
(  1.3x improvement)
ACORN
ExTru with ACORN
(b)
Fig. 7: The Time of Preparation Data (Encryption or Permutation/Toggling + Sub-
stitution) for Different Message Sizes (a) AES-GCM vs. ExTru with AES-GCM (b)
ACORN vs. ExTru with ACORN.
Table 7: The Energy Consumption of Preparation Data (Encryption or Permuta-
tion/Toggling + Substitution) for Different Message Sizes.
Design
Size*
32B 64B 128B 256B 512B 768B 1KB 2KB
ACORN 17.01 18.69 22.06 28.79 42.26 55.73 69.20 123.1
ExTru with ACORN 30.66 30.80 31.09 31.67 32.82 33.98 35.13 39.75
AES-GCM 46.28 93.28 188.2 379.8 756.6 1143 1523 3055
ExTru with AES-GCM 151.1 151.4 152.1 153.3 155.8 158.4 160.9 173.1
* Message Size
work results in significantly less energy consumption in ExTru compared to
corresponding ciphers. As it can be seen, ExTru reduces energy consumption by
94.5% and 67.8% compared to GCM and ACORN, respectively.
As mentioned previously, ExTru has been verified on both ASIC and FPGA.
Table 8 demonstrates the resource utilization of the proposed scheme compared
to ciphers on Nexys-4 DDR with Xilinx Artix 7. The results in FPGA are ap-
proximately similar to that of ASIC. As expected, ACORN provides higher max-
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Table 8: Resource Utilization of ExTru compared to corresponding ciphers in Nexys-4
DDR with Xilinx Artix 7 (XC7A100T-1CSG324).
Design LUTs Registers Maximum Frequency
ACORN 1090 530 178.5 MHz
ExTru with ACORN 1609 1573 172.5 MHz
AES-GCM 3803 4418 158.3 MHz
ExTru with AES-GCM 4376 5461 152.4 MHz
imum frequency due to its lightweight structure. However, using more resources
in high-performance AES-GCM results in better throughput even with lower
frequency.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed ExTru as a dynamic encrypted high speed communi-
cation, which is able to provide a level of trust using near non-blocking config-
urable switching and toggling network (CSTN ). ExTru uses near non-blocking
CSTN as a transceiver data. Although the configuration of CSTN will be gener-
ated by TRNG, ExTru changes the configuration based on a time-interval which
is identified by the SAT to guarantee the security of communication. Using this
dynamically encrypted mechanism mitigates energy consumption by 94.5% and
67.8% compared to AES-GCM (authenticated) and ACORN (stream) while se-
curity is guaranteed. In addition, ExTru is able to provide up to 24.4× and
4.3× speed-up for 2KB messages in comparison with AES-GCM and ACORN,
respectively.
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